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Honoring the Victims: How the Change in Ethics Ruined Science in the Third Reich and What to 
Do With the Remaining Medical Data 
With the Russians advancing and ultimately bringing the defeat of the Third Reich, the 
Nazi government struggled to destroy all evidence of their horrors committed on humanity, from 
the documents detailing the number of victims executed in the “Euthanasia” Program to the 
concentration camps themselves. They were not totally successful in their concealment. On 
December 9, 1946, the American military tribunal used the procured evidence of Nazi human 
experimentation and general disregard for humanity to charge twenty-three former Nazi medical 
doctors and assistants for war crimes (Spitz 22). They faced four charges in the Nuremberg 
Doctors’ Trial, including the charge of whether they had active participation in the country’s 
genocide or in nonconsensual and/or unethical human experimentation (22-23). The twenty-three 
accused were previously reputable doctors and officials who chose to exploit the dehumanization 
of groups to satisfy their medical curiosities; they either had direct participation in or oversaw 
the procedures of the atrocities. While the basis of their experiments might have been promising, 
the unethical manner in which they were conducted violated their Hippocratic Oaths and the 
German Guidelines of Human Experimentation that had been published in 1931. Interestingly, 
these guidelines remained in effect through the duration of World War II, ultimately giving the 
tribunal judges presiding over the Doctors’ Trial additional evidence to warrant criminal action 
against those alleged to be guilty (Reich).  At the trial’s conclusion on August 20, 1947, seven of 
the defendants were acquitted, seven received death sentences, and the remainder received prison 
sentences ranging from ten years to life (Spitz 264-265). From this trial, the Nuremberg Code of 
ethical human experimentation was created, further emphasizing the safety of all human subjects, 
and the idea of ethical conduct was brought to the forefront of all research expectations.  
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There remains the problem, however, of what to do with the remaining data from these 
inhumane experiments. The debate over documents that possibly hold valuable information, yet 
also contain the stories of several hundred tortured victims, resulted in strong debate about 
whether it is permissible to use the data for research purposes. After World War II, discussion 
emerged in favor of using the data, but it was not until Dr. Robert Pozos’ research on 
hypothermia, which built off of the Dachau freezing experiments, that the idea of using the 
information for societal benefits became more popular. Explaining that using the data could 
“advance work in that it takes human subjects farther than we’re willing,” Pozos sparked a 
renewed interest in the scientific community over the possibility of using the unethically-
acquired data for good (Cohen). Naturally, there was opposition to this idea, particularly from 
several of those who were forced to undergo the experiments themselves. Eva Moses Kor and 
Sara Vigorito, both surviving victims, are the most notable individuals who openly opposed the 
use of the medical data. Likening the use of information to “building on top of Auschwitz,” 
Vigorito demanded that the focus be brought back to the victims who personally suffered 
(Mostow 403). The debate over the ethics of using the medical data continues to be in a 
stalemate in contemporary discussions.  
The difficulty of reaching a satisfactory decision has potentially become less arduous if 
the unethical human experiments throughout Nazi Germany are examined as a whole. This 
method of analysis follows the Doctors’ Trial indictments, where the charges for “crimes against 
humanity” was defined as performing both harmful medical experiments and mass murder 
through the Euthanasia Program (Spitz 22-23). Implemented within and outside the 
concentration camps, the program allowed the ethical mindset of an already struggling country to 
waver by providing the German people with a nationalistic pride to serve as a distraction from 
Mitchell 3 
 
the thousands who were murdered. Those deemed as racially impure or morally reprehensible 
were dehumanized, and thus were stripped of their rights when experimented on. In the 
concentration camps, there was additional mental agony for the prisoner-doctors who were 
forced to aid in the experiments, having to sacrifice their moral responsibilities in order to 
survive. Lastly, regardless of their numerous advancements in warfare technology, the scientific 
community itself suffered for its gross indifference to preserving the ethical code in human 
experimentation. These facts must all be taken into consideration when broaching the debate of 
using the medical data. Despite the lack of ethics, the experiments were still “good science” 
because they followed the correct guidelines of experimentation. On the other hand, there is the 
possibility that the data is being viewed under “idealization and social benefit biases”, thus 
ignoring the suffering that took place in favor for keeping the data. While it is possible to 
recognize that there is some use to the data collected from these experiments, it is essential to 
also recognize the human costs of obtaining this data. Therefore, one suggested compromise to 
the debate is to memorialize the atrocities—both through victim narratives and through physical 
or abstract memorials—and by giving the credit of any discoveries found from the data solely to 
the victims of the experiments. Ultimately, the question comes down to whether there can be a 
compromise, or does one side truly have to yield in order to find a clear resolution for this 
debate. 
Part I: Setting the Parameters  
In order to begin the debate about the use of the medical data, it is essential to first 
understand what is capable of being labeled as ethical or unethical. Ethics is officially defined as 
“the moral principles or system associated with a particular leader, thinker, school of thought or 
an area of enquiry, or with a particular historical group” (“ethics n.2.a.”). From a philosophical 
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viewpoint, the term refers to the broad and often debated concept that is concerned with 
distinguishing between good and evil in the world (“ethics n.1.b.”). Rules are established by the 
majority in a group that creates a clear divide between what is allowable and what is not. At its 
most basic form, ethics is intended to be incapable of gradability, meaning that an action or 
situation cannot be “somewhat unethical” or “mostly ethical.” While a larger amount of abuses 
of the ethical code might equate to a larger crime, the number of violations does not also mean 
that the situation can be considered more unethical than another. Along the same lines, when an 
action is identified as unethical it does not necessarily need to correlate to being murderous or 
torturous. Even experiments yielding beneficial results can be unethical if the researcher did not 
obtain consent or hid any details of the program from the subject. Once one of the rules has been 
violated, an action or situation that had once been ethical is now strictly unethical. 
Additionally, ethics is not concrete; the concept is capable of changing over time and 
differs through cultures. For example, Edward Jenner’s famous experiment of injecting a boy 
with smallpox to determine whether his previous inoculation of cowpox would immunize the 
boy is often celebrated since he had discovered the vaccine for smallpox. However, only ten 
years after the end of the war, a similar method of experimentation was done in the Willowbrook 
Experiments in New York, where doctors infected mentally disabled children with the hepatitis 
virus to see whether gamma globulin antibodies could grant them immunity from the disease 
(Krugman). Overall, the experiment was a success. Despite both experiments being incredibly 
similar in their methods (both of the researchers received consent from the parents), only the 
Willowbrook Experiments is listed as an example of unethical research. This shows that as more 
research is done on acceptable ways to perform human experiments, the ethical code is updated 
to match the information and technology of the time to prevent the infringement of human rights.  
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The solidity of the ethical mindset of a group depends entirely on the strength of those 
who are ensuring that the moral code is being followed. It is unrealistic to believe that every 
individual will accept the group’s rules of ethics, and thus to safeguard against the dissenter’s 
disagreement from spreading, the powerful majority of the group must be capable of enforcing 
the rules so that no violations take place. Of course, in a world where an ethical code is usually 
decided on how to keep humanity from committing evil, there are cases where going against the 
norm has turned out to be an improvement for society. This in turn generates an update in the 
ethics when the shift results in the majority losing their power and other individuals are given the 
opportunity to usurp control. For this to occur, the individuals of one group overall need to have 
a shift in their ethical mindset. The shift can either be positive or negative, and leaves the group 
largely in a weakened state that is susceptible to either progress or corruption depending on the 
next majority who take control. This change in ethics is not a stand-alone event—it is 
continuous, even occurring in today’s society. For example, the recent outbreak of measles in 
January of 2015 was caused by parents choosing to not vaccinate their children for fear that they 
would develop autism (McCoy). Citing a retracted medical study performed by a disgraced 
British doctor named Andrew Wakefield, the outbreak of a once-dormant disease “is disturbing” 
in that it shows that ill-informed people will follow those with the supposed answers to their 
misfortunes, even after the leaders have been publicly discredited (McCoy). Whether in small 
communities or in entire countries, due to the constant change in the powerful majority, the 
concept of fluctuating ethics uses the shift in a group’s mindset to facilitate change.  
For Germany after 1918, their weakened state allowed for a government that was capable 
of changing the country’s ethical code to slowly gain power. The defeat in World War I and the 
signing of the Treaty of Versailles left Germany—then referred to as the Weimar Republic—
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largely unstable as the country suffered the aftereffects of the war, such as a hyper-inflated 
economy and political extremism. Through careful legislation that restructured the country’s 
debt, the Weimar Republic was successful in rebalancing their currency and largely eliminated 
many of the requirements for the Treaty of Versailles (Shirer 136). However, it was the Great 
Depression of 1930-1933 that caused the surge in unemployment, the fall in the country’s 
morale, and the eventual ascension of the Nazi Party (136-137). In an effort to prevent a 
reversion in their progress, the President of the Weimar Republic, Paul von Hindenburg, granted 
emergency dictatorial powers to the government. On January 30, 1933, after intense pressure that 
his political party placed on the government, Adolf Hitler was appointed Chancellor of Germany 
(183–184). A year later, after Hindenburg’s death, Hitler consolidated his dictatorial power by 
merging the powers and offices of the Chancellery and Presidency (184-185). The Nazi Party 
had now become the powerful majority over the German people.  
Hitler’s usurpation of rule had occurred quickly. He was an impressive and reassuring 
public figure for the German public, and his power only increased after he revived the shattered 
economy. Enlisting the help of Joseph Goebbels was also beneficial, as Goebbels promoted 
inspiring propaganda about a new and stronger Germany that did not have to be confined by the 
Treaty of Versailles (Kershaw 50–59). After years of living in the instability of the Weimar 
Republic, the country was redeveloping their sense of national pride and thus, whether aware of 
it or not, was susceptible to a change in its beliefs. Encouraged by Hitler and the Nazi Party, the 
racist ideology of human eugenics that promoted the purity of the German Aryan race gained 
popularity in Germany until it was eventually seen as a legitimate form of science. This form of 
pseudo-science was coupled with a barrage of propaganda that took advantage of the anti-
Semitism already present in the country to blame the Jewish population for Germany’s moral 
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weakening (50-59). With Germany finally prospering from Hitler’s improvements in the 
government, the majority of the Germans did not fight this reasoning—most accepted it, leading 
them largely to become desensitized to the victims’ plight. Finally, the dehumanization of Jews 
was complete with the establishment of the Nuremberg Laws of 1935 that stripped them of their 
basic rights (Shirer 230). The resulting increase in Jews and other “immoral” groups that were 
condemned and executed was unprecedented. For the medical and scientific communities, there 
was a sudden increase in “material” (i.e.: human bodies) they could use in their experiments 
without any legal or community-based ethical repercussions.  
An amoral epidemic then spread throughout Germany; the prevalent “racial hygiene” 
mindset acted as protection for the doctors and scientists who took this unique opportunity to 
advance their careers. Already relieved of some of the competition when Jewish intellectuals 
were barred from practicing in their fields, German scientists could perform human 
experimentation with no restrictions since the undesirables were no longer thought of as fully 
human. Whether it was to actually practice science, to promote the theory of eugenics or to 
simply satisfy their morbid curiosity through scientific means, scientists who used the human 
subjects without consent or regard of their human rights, whether dead or alive, are guilty of 
unethical practice. This guilt extends beyond the gates of the concentration camps as well. Due 
to the Euthanasia Program, scientists and anatomists were regularly given bodies of political 
prisoners who were murdered to protect the longevity of the Reich government. While they 
might not have tortured or killed the prisoners themselves, the scientific community still 
benefited from the attitudes and daily routine of the Nazi thinking. Many did not question where 
their human “material” came from, chiefly because they did not want to know if they were 
working with executed political prisoners, and so they deluded themselves into thinking that they 
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were only using bodies of the most criminal, such as murderers. While the use of cadavers has its 
own ethical standards separate from those for living subjects, the studies with these bodies still 
remain unethical due to the fact that they indirectly aided in supporting the Nazi government’s 
view of “cleansing” the sick, immoral, and degenerate. Thus, they profited with little complaint 
so long as the government continued to execute prisoners and the bodies continued to be shipped 
to their facilities.  
Some of the data from these experiments have proved valuable. For example, anatomist 
Hermann Stieve took advantage of female prisoners awaiting execution to analyze their 
menstrual cycles, and his work is still cited to this day in reproductive studies. In large part, 
however, the seduction of academic honor that the pseudoscientific branch of eugenics promised 
resulted in much of the research conclusions in that field to be unfounded. Nazi researchers felt 
the pressure to produce results that supported the theory of human eugenics, leaving many to 
either fabricate or alter the data to come up with original conclusions. If any of the information 
that came from these experiments was found to be valuable, it was often an accidental discovery.  
When confronting the ethics of using the medical data from human experimentation, the 
focus is often restricted to the data that was collected in the concentration camps. With all of the 
known examples of unethical experiments taking place outside these compounds, why is this the 
case? In part, the Doctors’ Trial brought to light information about unethical practices of which 
the world was previously unaware, and the resulting Nuremberg Code set new standards for the 
global medical community. Additionally, it is common practice for a population to focus on the 
largest group of victims when an atrocity occurs. In this case, those who suffered from 
experimentation in the concentration camps were the first to receive attention and fight for 
compensation once the war was over. However, as more information is being recovered, and the 
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atrocities of previously unknown human experimentation outside the camps are being unearthed, 
there comes the question of whether it is time to finally involve all of the victims of unethical 
human experimentation in the debate.  
The idea of including other examples of unethical experimentation does come with its 
own difficulties. It is possible that its inclusion will not bring the debate any closer to a 
satisfactory conclusion. Rather, the additional data can potentially benefit both sides of the 
argument, keeping the stalemate in place. Perhaps there are factors that are capable of preventing 
its inclusion; the idea that these experiments were not on the same level of severity as those in 
the camps may be one of them. However, this type of thinking will quickly derail the discussion. 
The number of those harmed and killed, or the severity of the experiments does not prove one 
event was more unethical than another, only that more crimes were committed. There is no 
hierarchy when determining the ethics of a situation—as previously mentioned, once an ethical 
rule is broken, the entire action is unethical. Another reason is that, due to the Nazis’ need to 
record everything and the evidence that was compiled for the Doctors’ Trial, it is far easier to 
demand justice for the victims in the concentration camps since the experiments happened in 
specific areas rather than in locations throughout Germany. As such, people remember the 
images of the naked, dead bodies thrown in piles more than they would the execution of a lone 
political prisoner, but that does not make one death worse than another’s. Finally, a reason why 
the other examples could not be included in the debate is the simple truth that several of the 
research projects performed outside the camps actually produced beneficial results. In Stieve’s 
case, his research using women facing a death sentence concluded that stress affected the 
reproductive system and the rhythm method did not prevent pregnancies (Bazelon). His method 
of research was never contested, and his conclusions aided in further studies of the female genital 
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system. However, to ignore the fact that Stieve was benefiting from the Nazi justice system 
means distorting the truth of how he was able to accomplish his research. Those who practiced 
unethical human experimentation in Nazi Germany and remained largely unpunished, like 
Stieve, is why it is necessary to include the data outside of the concentration camps. A discussion 
that is meant to provoke some type of change demands that all possibilities and examples be 
present. Thus, when determining the future of the data, it is essential to analyze all of the 
examples of unethical human experimentation during the Third Reich.  
Part II: Personal Narrative and the Case Against Using the Data 
Eva Mozes Kor was ten when she stepped off of the packed cattle car in front of the gates 
of Auschwitz. She remembers going nearly four days without food or water, watching as her 
parents, her protectors, turned powerless in front of her. She also remembers the matching 
burgundy dresses she wore with her identical twin sister, Miriam—the only pieces of home that 
they were ultimately allowed to keep (Kor 22-25). She was told that her and Miriam would 
receive special privileges as twins, but as their long hair was cut and large red crosses were 
painted on the backs of their dresses for easy identification, Eva did not feel very privileged (30). 
In Auschwitz, twins were sought after; they were used in Dr. Mengele’s research to find the 
secret to twinning so that the information could help rapidly increase the Aryan population. 
Chosen as Mengele’s twins, Eva and Miriam were subject to three days in the labs for intensive 
studies and then three days in the blood labs in neighboring Birkenau (44). Two attendants 
worked on the sets of twins at a time, taking blood from the left arm and injecting up to five 
needles full of unknown substances into the right arm (44-45). The twin girls did not talk about 
the tests nor about the possibility of death; they knew that by giving them “our blood, our bodies, 
our pride, [and] our dignity…in turn, they let us live one more day” (45). It was not until after 
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the war ended did they find out that they were injected with various types of diseases followed 
by inoculations of experimental vaccines to test their curative abilities. 
In July, one of the viruses Eva received made her intensely ill and put her in the 
infirmary. While she was unaware of what she was suffering from, Mengele knew what disease 
she was given and how it would progress—she remembers him stating that she was only 
expected to live for two more weeks (65). Miriam was put into confinement to wait until Eva’s 
death, where she would then be killed and the both of them would be autopsied to compare the 
effects of diseases on the sick and healthy bodies that were nearly identical (68-69). 
Fortunately—nearly miraculously—Eva survived, primarily because she knew that she “could 
not think of [herself] as a victim, or [she] knew [she] would perish” (48). By dragging her body 
to a faucet to drink water every night and manipulating the thermometer by putting it underneath 
her armpit, Eva’s fever broke, and the twins endured life in the camp until the liberation by the 
forces of the Soviet Union in 1945. Reflecting back, Eva views her survival with a sense of 
triumph for she, “a ten-year-old girl, triumphed over Mengele by surviving his experiment” (69). 
However, Eva and Miriam’s afflictions did not end once the war was over. Like many of the 
human experimentation victims, Eva is unaware of the virus she was given that nearly killed her; 
she has only been able to narrow it down to spotted fever or beriberi (65). Additionally, some of 
the injections Miriam was given had stunted the growth of her kidneys to a ten-year-old’s, 
causing her continued medical problems until her death in 1993 (130-131). Another survivor of 
Mengele’s twin experiments, Sara Vigorito, suffered similarly: after the constant injections, she 
remained ill up to seven years after the Auschwitz liberation (Mostow).  
The survivors did not only suffer from the lasting physical afflictions; emotional trauma 
also plagued them. For Eva, her “childhood experiences” continued to haunt her well into 
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adulthood (Kor 129). This use of the phrase of ‘childhood experiences’ when describing her past 
is interesting. The connotation for the term ‘childhood’ is often positive, since it usually 
describes a period of innocence and relative safety as the child grows and adapts in the world. In 
Eva’s case, she never had a true stage of childhood. Forced into captivity and experimentation, 
Eva’s childhood was marred by death and fear—she had no choice but to mature quickly or else 
perish if she continued to act like a helpless child. By their eleventh birthday, Eva and Miriam 
have already stepped into adulthood due to their passionate need to survive. Within the 
concentration camp, even after liberation, they had to fend for themselves—a mentality that all 
of the surviving adult prisoners held, and thus was also expected of the younger prisoners. 
However, while they had reached adulthood within the camp, they were reverted to children once 
they left the gates of Auschwitz, causing a dizzying effect on their emotional states. While 
staying at an orphanage, Eva remembers feeling angry at the toys in their room: “Toys were for 
children. I was eleven years old, but I no longer knew how to play” (98). This, coupled with the 
fact that the nuns refused to let children be released if they had no parents, was unsettling for 
Eva. Within the camp, she had to find food and shelter herself without the aid of an adult, yet 
here in this orphanage—and even later, when they were finally moved to live with an aunt—she 
was expected to relinquish control of her safety back to the adults.  
Eva had only found this acceptable if the rest of her family also survived and were there 
to care for them, but the twins soon had to face the reality that they were the only surviving 
members of the Mozes family. Having lost her parents and two older sisters caused additional 
emotional duress for Eva, and she frequently had nightmares. After hearing that the Nazis made 
soap out of Jewish fat, she dreamed that the soap bars spoke to her in the voices of her parents 
and sisters, “asking [her], “Why are you washing with us?”” (118). Polish novelist Zofia 
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Nalkowska, a civilian survivor who felt the need to write about her own experiences in the 
Warsaw ghetto, also refers to the Nazis’ attempt to make soap from Jewish fat. Concentrating on 
the trial of a laboratory assistant who aided in soap production, Nalkowska uses the assistant’s 
statements to allude to the complicity of the German people and the hunger for academic acclaim 
of the doctors. The assistant dutifully explains his part, even stating with complete frankness that 
he did not know that making soap from human fat was a crime (Nalkowska 9). He also explains 
that his superior, Dr. Spanner, kept the soap production for the possibility that he was either a 
pioneer in this soap-making method and thus would include it in his research findings, or he did 
not have authorization to perform the procedure (9). What is most revealing about the assistant’s 
testimony is his own experience with using the soap: “I used to get the creeps thinking about 
washing myself with it…I got used to it because it was good…” (9). Despite being personally 
involved with the production and thus knowing the contents of the soap, he still continued to use 
it. While cleaning himself with human fat was initially disgusting, he soon was able to overlook 
this fact due to the benefits of the soap. Nalkowska goes on to further her point when she ends 
the story with one of Spanner’s colleagues testifying how it could be possible that, since 
Germany was experiencing a shortage of fat, Spanner might have felt inclined to produce 
additional fat for the “good of the nation” (10). For the Germans producing and using the soap, it 
was portrayed as an inventive way of “building something from nothing” (9). For the Jewish 
survivors, however, the idea that they could be washing with innocent victims of the Reich 
regime was just another method of emotional abuse that plagued them even after their liberation.  
There was a similar occurrence for those who were forced to aid the German doctors with 
the experiments in the concentration camps. Many took this advantage as their only method of 
survival, hoping that if they continued to be useful then they would not be executed. Having been 
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previously barred from practice in Germany, being a prisoner-doctor allowed them to once again 
work in their field. Without the need to pay or give credit to them, prisoner-doctors received 
more benefits than the standard camp inmate to act as positive reinforcement, such as receiving 
better rations and often being allowed to wear civilian clothing while working (Nyiszli 19). 
However, the decision was not without moral anguish, much like what Dr. Miklós Nyiszli 
underwent as Mengele’s forensic pathologist. Though he was able to live in relative comfort due 
to his elevated status and could practice his skills, Nyiszli faced much mental turmoil over the 
fact that he had to perform autopsies on prisoners. The only way to cope was by forcing a change 
in his own ethical mindset. The sole goal within the concentration camps was survival, and 
Nyiszli adapted so that his pride in his profession triumphed over his other concerns (19, 35). 
However, his former ethical code still surfaced at times, typically whenever he would refuse to 
administer poison to assist in a prisoner’s suicide so that they could avoid a more gruesome death 
(71). While he would have been following correct procedure as a medical professional, for a 
prisoner-doctor it was not ethical. As someone who had the power to allow another prisoner to 
die with an amount of dignity, by refusing to help Nyiszli took away even this last bit of control 
from the prisoners. It was not until after his liberation was he finally able to reestablish his 
former ethical code, but by then the forced change in his personal morals ruined his dignity as a 
doctor. The trauma of working on the bodies of victims who died needlessly and having his skills 
misused caused Nyiszli to swear that he would never lift a scalpel again (222). Only through 
telling his story had Nyiszli managed to achieve some form of closure, but even then his dignity 
as a doctor had been shattered. Using the data then ignores the mental trauma prisoner-doctors 
underwent and the fact that they were essentially forced to practice unethically.  
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The unethical practices of the Third Reich were not isolated events that were void of 
consequences or damaging aftereffects. In fact, the strongest arguments against using the medical 
data from human experimentations appears when one considers the aftermath of these 
experiments. Though they received financial compensation for their torment, the lives of the 
surviving subjects after the experiments seem to have been largely forgotten once the debate of 
using the medical data began. Often pushed out of the discussion for their “emotional bias,” 
survivors against the use of the information fear that their torture will be overlooked because of 
the possible benefits of the medical data (Crane). Viewing the medical data separately from the 
stories of torture can be dangerous because it gives the impression that the conclusions were the 
only things to have come from the experiments. This completely neglects the victims that 
suffered even after the war, who all felt that they lost both their dignity and humanity by being 
forcibly experimented on. If the human subjects’ rights are the most important when conducting 
an experiment, then the use of data from any unethical experiment should be prohibited. This 
type of thinking follows the idea that any human experiments that can cause harm to the subject 
are forbidden, as was explained in the German Guidelines of Human Experimentation. Published 
in 1931, German scientists were expected to follow this reasoning, and guidelines for human 
experimentation was published in a Circular of the Reich Minister of the Interior in 1931 
(Reich). The article first established two types of experimentation—innovative therapy and 
scientific experimentation—before listing requirements to ensure that the research was done 
ethically. Scientific experimentation is defined as “interventions and treatment methods that 
involve humans and are undertaken for research purposes without serving a therapeutic purpose 
in an individual case” (Reich). The first and arguably the most important requirement for ethical 
experimentation is that the researcher must have consent from the participants. By not getting 
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consent from the victims (among other ethical abuses), the researchers violated their rights as 
individuals, denying their freedom and control over their own bodies. Once the experiments were 
over, the stories of their torture were all the victims had left. The survivors—not the data—must 
be allowed to be the ones in control by telling their stories. These stories not only act as a form 
of closure for them, but it also gives them back their dignity that was stolen. To deny these 
people their voice in the debate means once again taking advantage of them.  
Additionally, allowing the use of the data could suggest to some degree the scientific 
community’s complicity in the Nazi experiments. Regardless of how vocal the scientific 
community is about denouncing the ethics of the research, the data cannot be used without 
justifying, at least to some extent, the entire Nazi justice system (Winkelmann and Schagen 168). 
By focusing more on the data from the unethical research instead of on the humans who suffered, 
it might be thought that the scientific community is pardoning the guilty researchers again and 
ignoring the needs of the victims. This tendency to excuse doctors and scientists is not 
uncommon, for medical researchers are routinely under-criminalized, even when there is 
evidence that they have breached the ethical code of proper human experimentation. In the 
article “When Human Experimentation is Criminal,” L. Song Richardson argues why the 
“idealization bias” and the “social benefit bias” habitually protect researchers even when their 
experiments turn unethical. Due to their heightened social status as care-givers or protectors, it 
can be difficult for individuals to view medical researchers as “criminals deserving of 
punishment” (Richardson 92). People have trouble distinguishing the guilty person from his or 
her role as a doctor and the expectations that come with the title. Additionally, the belief that 
their research can have potential societal value allows many people to ignore or even forgive the 
violated ethics in the research (92). Not only are the victims harmed by these viewpoints, but it 
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also continues to give the scientific community a warped point of view when it comes to human 
experimentation. The lack of criminalization for those who do not follow the ethics of proper 
human experimentation perpetrates the belief that unethical research can occur as long as the 
researcher has good intentions and valuable data is produced.  
About half of the twenty-three former Nazi doctors tried at the Nuremberg Doctors’ Trial 
used the “idealization bias” and the “social benefit bias” as their defense. Dr. Karl Brandt, Adolf 
Hitler's high-ranking attending physician, sums it up the best in his final statement: “It is 
immaterial for the experiment whether it was done with or against the will of the person 
concerned…The meaning is the motive—[the] devotion to the community…Ethics of every form 
are decided by an order or obedience…” (Spitz 258). While many were found guilty of war 
crimes, thus disproving to an extent the “idealization bias,” the fight from the scientific 
community to use the medical data actually reaffirms both the “idealization bias” and the “social 
benefit bias.” They argue for the scientific validity of the experiments and are also willing to 
ignore the violation of ethics in the research, primarily so that they can obtain what can possibly 
be valuable data. Unlike Brandt and the twenty-two other accused doctors, the researchers who 
were not tried in the Nuremberg Trials had an even easier time avoiding being condemned and 
their work disgraced. Stieve was one of the scientists whose work was not critically analyzed 
until well after his death in 1952. After the war, Stieve was questioned by the Soviet military 
authorities and the Berlin University administration for further detail about the bodies he used in 
his research. Interestingly, Stieve’s reflection on his research echoes Brandt’s final statement: “in 
no way do I need to be ashamed of the fact that I was able to reveal new data from the bodies of 
the executed, facts that were unknown before and are now recognized by the whole world” 
(Bazelon). However, the authorities and administration quickly abandoned any suspicions about 
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the unethical conduct in Stieve’s research, possibly because the “suspicions did not outweigh 
Stieve’s importance for the re-establishment of the Berlin University” where he continued as the 
director of the Anatomical Institute (Winkelmann and Schagen 167). With research that was 
methodologically correct and contributing significantly to scientific debates, Stieve was able to 
circumvent criticism for his unethical practices, once again proving that the “idealization bias” 
and “social benefit bias” can cause complications in criminalizing the researcher.  
To simply remove the unethical researcher from the data cannot be enough. There must 
be a sense of closure for the victims in knowing that they were not expendable, and the fact that 
some survivors do not consent to having the information used should be enough for researchers 
to reject the use of the data. By ignoring the wishes of those who did not originally give consent 
to experimentation simply continues to taint the data. Even contemporary researchers with the 
best intentions and practice ethically will have their work dirtied by data that was produced from 
the benefits of the Nazi government. Therefore, the only solution is to not use the data but 
instead memorialize the documents as a way to honor the victims. Only then can they feel safe in 
knowing that their torture cannot be forgotten. In the article “"Like Building on top of 
Auschwitz": On the Symbolic Meaning of Using Data from the Nazi Experiments, and on Non-
Use as a Form of Memorial,” Peter Mostow argues that using the data does not honor the 
victims; its use would be more like a reminder that the scientific community is willing to ignore 
their torture in order to gain potentially beneficial research. Mostow believes that not using the 
data specifically because of what the victims of unethical experimentation endured is necessary, 
much like the Dachau and Auschwitz memorials were necessary to honor the victims of the 
concentration camps (411).  
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There is then the question of whether the memorial should be a physical one or an 
abstract one. Eva Mozes Kor suggested that the original Nazi medical notes be shredded and 
“placed in a glass case for all to see” at a camp like Auschwitz, but never to be used (Mostow 
415). However, the visceral reaction to the insignificance of shredded medical data might not be 
an effective memorial for all who view it. Additionally, keeping the memorial in a concentration 
camp does not adequately honor all victims of unethical human experimentation in Nazi 
Germany. A more abstract memorial where the data is forbidden to be used would be a more 
suitable memorial in this case. While non-use does mean that the scientific community loses 
potentially valuable data, it is a necessary sacrifice when the memorial signifies the lowest 
ethical point of scientific research. To keep the data of unethical research and the experiences of 
the victims separate is both an impossible and dangerous task because, if attempted, it can deny 
the survivors their right to regain their sense of humanity back by being in control of their own 
stories. Ensuring that the victims are able to engage in the debate is then essential. Ultimately, 
the only ethical response to the medical data is for it to not be used but instead memorialized, 
either by giving the victims the power to tell their stories or with an actual memorial. Whether it 
is through an abstract or physical memorial, the purpose is to both honor the victims and convey 
the perilous downward shift in ethics that leads to inhumane atrocities.   
Part III: The Lingering Effects of the Data 
After Dr. Robert Pozos was the first to publically debate (and condone) the use of the 
information, an interest sprouted within the scientific community to study whether the human 
experimentation data had any benefit for society. As a hypothermia specialist, Pozos’ research 
consisted of finding methods to rewarm chilled humans. At the time, the researchers in this field 
were only able to discover methods by trial-and-error since the majority of their information 
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came from studies done on animals (Cohen). While Pozos did run experiments with consenting 
human subjects, he refused to let their temperature drop below 36 degrees Celsius—a safe 
temperature, since the Nazi experiments proved that humans lose consciousness at 32 degrees 
Celsius (Spitz 89). He was forced to speculate how long the body can endure the cold and still be 
successfully rewarmed (Cohen). However, his answers could be found in the Nazi research. The 
head scientist of the freezing experiments in Dachau, Dr. Sigmund Rascher, would submerge 
victims in ice-cold vats for extended periods of time, often allowing the body temperature to 
drop well below 36 degrees Celsius. The experiment’s main goal was initially not 
extermination—Rascher was also concerned with the fastest possible way to rewarm human 
bodies so that the information could better aid the German soldiers fighting in freezing 
temperatures (Spitz 85). From his research, Rascher came to the conclusion that rapid-active 
rewarming with the use of blankets and heaters was more successful than gradual rewarming 
done with body contact, which had previously been believed (100). Rascher’s experiment was 
highly unethical—none of the victims consented to the procedure and many were left to die in 
the freezing vats—yet Pozos still saw potential in the medical data that could help complete his 
own research and be useful for society. His intent to use the Nazi information was met with great 
criticism, and he was denied the right to publish the Nazi data with his own notes in the New 
England Journal of Medicine by the journal's editor, Dr. Arnold Relman (Cohen). However, 
Pozos’ idea to use the medical data for societal good allowed the scientific community to view 
the Nazi data for its potential and not just for its lack of ethics. 
Those arguing for the use of the data say that the German scientists did not entirely forget 
themselves—the period of the eugenics theory did not suddenly make them incapable of 
adhering to the proper protocols for performing an experiment. World War II historian Richard 
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Evans upholds that Nazi science was not bad science; in fact, when the Third Reich scientific 
field as a whole is analyzed, he states how disturbingly simple “the reality was, how similar in 
form, if not content, their work was to the research of today” (Evans). Both the research facilities 
in Germany and in the concentration camps operated under normal conditions. Scientists were 
still subject to peer review in conferences and journals, and still had to get their research 
approved before being granted any funds to perform their experiments (Evans). Even the 
infamous Dr. Mengele still reported regularly to his mentor, Otmar von Verschuer, director of 
the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of Anthropology, on his progress in his research projects (Evans). 
The difference of the concentration camp facilities was that the Nazi scientists were able to use 
the skills of prisoner-doctors to aid them in their experiments, much like Dr. Miklós Nyiszli, the 
Jewish forensic pathologist that worked directly under Mengele. Understanding the chance for 
survival, Nyiszli worked to the best of his ability on all autopsies, eventually earning him respect 
from the Nazi doctors, several of whom would routinely come to him for personal treatment or 
additional training in pathology (Nyiszli 34-35). The doctors’ pride in their work was a strong 
theme inside and outside the concentration camps. A dictatorial government alone would not be 
enough to dismantle the correct way of practicing science, even if the ethical mindset of the 
country had been compromised. For science to be “good,” the methodology of the experiment 
must be correct and the steps of the research must be documented clearly enough so that the 
experiment is capable of being repeated. A correctly-performed experiment does not mean that it 
must also be ethical. Thus, there is the argument that since the experiments were performed 
scientifically, then the data has the potential of being valuable. Of course, the research done to 
support the eugenics theory would be considered scientifically insignificant, and the data from 
these experiments could not be included in this discussion. Regardless, the mere possibility that 
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some of the data can be beneficial for society is why the option to use it should be open to the 
scientific community. 
Additionally, there is the defense that once the information has been collected, it is ill-
advised to dismiss it. In his article “The Ethics of Using Nazi Medical Data,” Mark Weitzman, 
director of the Simon Wiesenthal Center's Museum of Tolerance, in Manhattan, states that 
“every part of civilization is built upon past knowledge, whether it is positive or negative” 
(Second Opinion). The malleability of ethics is the reason behind this; as a group takes into 
consideration the knowledge of their predecessors when making their own discoveries, they are 
able to update their moral code so that it better fits their society. Civilizations do not develop 
from only positive events; it takes an action or viewpoint that the population as a whole finds 
reprehensible to cause the change in the thinking. For a society to truly benefit from the change, 
the aberrant action should not be erased but kept documented so that there is no chance of it 
being repeated in the future. Thus, to ignore any corrupted medical data is like removing a 
critical piece of information from scientific history, which can not only lessen the horror of the 
atrocities committed but can also hide how quickly the scientific community can forget its 
morals. It is clear that the experiments done in Nazi Germany were unethical, but this alone 
should not determine the fate of the data. Data cannot be ethical or unethical. The path to 
retrieving the information may be so, but the data collected is incapable of following the standard 
of ethics; the results from an experiment are detached from the researcher’s intent and the 
subjects’ experiences. The scientific community is adamant in wishing to determine whether any 
good can come from the experiments because of the community’s emphasis on the potentiality of 
the data itself.  
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However, if the data is accepted, then there needs to be a set of regulations for its use. 
Above all else, the intent behind the Nazi experiments should never be separated from the data. 
Within the concentration camps, scientists conducted experiments largely with the objective to 
humiliate and torture prisoners. Often, the discoveries made from these experiments were 
accidental and not the true purpose of the research. The scientific community outside the camps 
may have had some form of extra restraint over their research practices, but they still benefited 
from the Nazi regime that murdered people for political reasons and gave the bodies to these 
researchers. The human subjects they often experimented with were those who were deemed 
immoral by the government so scientists did not have to follow the guidelines for human 
experimentation as stringently because they knew there would be no outcry from the German 
population—they would side with the doctors, not those they did not even consider human. It is 
for this reason that the only ethical way to use the data is if the victims are given the credit for 
any discoveries instead of the researchers. This is not to say that the scientific community should 
collectively forget about the evils of the doctors; their names and the horrors they committed 
must be never be forgotten to avoid absolving them. When referencing the data, though, only the 
victims of the experiments and what rules of ethical human experimentation were broken should 
be mentioned. It is because of these victims that the experiments were even conducted in the first 
place, and they are the reason for the new discoveries to have occurred. By listing the lack of 
ethics in the research (such examples can be the absence of consent from the participants or the 
unnecessary and often fatal results), the focus is taken away from the scientists and instead given 
to those who suffered needlessly.  
While commemorating the victims individually for each experiment may be a difficult 
task—particularly since the Nazis were intent on destroying any incriminating data, so much of 
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the information on the victims was lost—there are still other ways of giving credit to them. With 
the remaining evidence, it can be possible to at least determine the religion, nationality, and 
possibly even hometown of the subjects, and this information should be included when giving 
credit to the victims. To do this can take away some of the anonymity of the human subjects, 
bringing the focus back on the individuals instead of only seeing them as numbers. An excellent 
example of this being put into practice is with Stieve and his research. As the head of the 
University of Berlin’s Institute of Anatomy, Stieve was a staunch supporter of Hitler’s practices, 
welcoming the idea of creating a strong, unified Germany. Like others in the medical 
community, he did not protest when the government began expelling Jewish doctors from 
universities in 1933 (Bazelon). Rather, he used the changing government to his advantage. After 
the fall of the Weimar Republic the Third Reich employed the death sentence more liberally 
which granted Stieve an “unprecedented number of women” for his research (Bazelon). Stieve’s 
interest throughout his career was the effect of stress and other environmental conditions on the 
female reproductive system. Studying first with hens and newts, Stieve was restricted in the 
research subjects he was able to use, usually only being able to get the uterus itself from 
donations by gynecology doctors (Bazelon). However, as more women were given the death 
sentence in Third Reich Germany, the supply of female subjects surged. Along with the body, he 
was able to obtain the medical histories before they died from prison records or interviews done 
by his assistants, including “information about their menstrual cycles, their reactions to the 
prison environment, and the impact of receiving a death sentence” (Bazelon). From this data and 
the harvested organs of the deceased, Stieve published 230 anatomical papers on the subject of 
the female reproductive system. The menstrual cycles of the women facing a death sentence 
became irregular, where the stress and anxiety either caused them to experience “shock 
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bleedings” or not menstruate at all (Hildebrandt). Additionally, their ovulation could no longer 
be accurately tracked. Stieve was able to draw two conclusions that are still accepted today. First, 
that the rhythm method—avoiding conception by only having intercourse during the times when 
the woman is less likely to be ovulating—could not effectively prevent pregnancies, and that 
chronic stress affects the female reproductive system (Bazelon). 
It is important to note that this was not a simple case of taking advantage of the sudden 
increase in cadavers. Stieve’s research required that he be able to study the women from the time 
of their sentencing to the day of their execution before he harvested their organs. Often, if the 
women were not immediately executed, Stieve had a long time period to chart the variances in 
the sentenced women’s reproductive systems. For example, he included in one of his books an 
illustration of a woman’s left ovary that showed signs of not menstruating for “157 days due to 
nervous agitation” (Bazelon). Was Stieve merely seeing a window of opportunity to advance his 
research and taking it? After all, these were women under a death sentence—they were 
condemned to die and Stieve would not have been capable of solving that, even if he had wished 
to. If successful, his work could be beneficial to the medical community and the opportunity to 
discover more about the reproductive system could be fulfilled. However, out of the 174 women 
Stieve studied, none of them volunteered for dissection (Hildebrandt). 
Only by crediting the victims instead of the researchers can the debate over the ethics of 
using the medical data come any closer to a conclusion. With the information already collected, 
it is senseless to dismiss it for being corrupt, especially if the data has any value for society. In 
Stieve’s case, his conclusions are still widely and uncritically used, particularly since he was one 
of the first researchers to find the correlation between stress and the absence of bleeding during 
the menstrual cycle. The fact that the information from his unethical research still contributes to 
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reproductive studies shows that the scientific community is willing to utilize any data that is 
productive. Simply, if the data can be useful, then it should be used. The next step in continuing 
to work with Stieve’s data must be to transfer the credit to the female victims of this research. 
Fortunately, there has already been progress made in identifying these women. Sabine 
Hildebrandt published her article “The Women on Stieve's List: Victims of National Socialism 
Whose Bodies were Used for Anatomical Research” in December of 2012, where she was 
successful in not only naming 170 of the 174 victims, but also finding out their biographies and 
the reason they received a death sentence. Many of the women were political prisoners—a few 
being prominent resistance fighters, such as Bronisława Czubakowska, Herta Lindner, and 
Libertas Schulze-Boysen, who were all denied their last wish of having their bodies be returned 
to their mothers after their execution (Hildebrandt). Some of the women were also standard 
criminals, guilty of murder or arson. One of the women in particular, a young Polish woman who 
has yet to be identified, was six months pregnant after being raped by a farmer for whom she 
worked as a forced laborer (Hildebrandt). She had killed this man and was awaiting her 
execution (Hildebrandt). It was with these women’s bodies that Stieve had been able to draw his 
conclusions; the women never consented to being a part of his research. Thus, the credit for the 
discoveries should be given to the 174 women, not the unethical researcher.  
The somber reality is that, despite the measures taken to prevent it, unethical human 
experimentation cannot be completely eradicated. While the majority of the world may function 
on one agreed-upon code of ethics, it does not mean that every individual will adhere to the 
guidelines. The world is then placed in a moral battle over what to do with the information that 
was collected unethically. The simplest answer to this problem is to never forget the atrocities 
that occurred. Do not dismiss the research and data for being corrupted, but instead use the 
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experiments as a reminder through personal narrative and a physical reminder for why the 
scientific community must have a code of ethics. When using the data in new research, 
additional steps should be taken so that the victims are the ones who get the credit. This way, the 
researchers cannot be absolved of their crimes and the data can still be used to possibly aid in 
new discoveries.  
 
In the debate over using the Nazi medical data, there appears to be two different 
interpretations on protecting human rights: aggressive and defensive action. While using the data 
can provide the scientific community information that can bring about societal potential—and 
thus salvaging some good out of the evil—are the survivors’ sentiments on the subject truly 
being heard? The idea that the victims are once again being abused by using the information 
without their consent is not a matter to be taken lightly. On the other hand, if the data is valuable, 
it can be detrimental to scientific experimentation to deny access or even destroy the data. There 
is also another part of this argument: the fear that either denying or accepting the use of the data 
might be considered historically revisionist. To not use the data could mean that the infamous 
doctors in charge might eventually no longer be blamed for their committed horrors. On the other 
hand, its use could suggest that the experiments were conducted ethically enough to merit the use 
of their findings. After World War II and the Nuremberg Trials, there were a large amount of 
Holocaust deniers who adamantly protested that the genocide either did not actually occur or was 
not on such a large-scale as people were thought to believe. This type of denial was prevalent in 
Germany, particularly in the medical community; it was not until 2012—over sixty years after 
the war—that the German Medical Association finally acknowledged the accountability of 
Germany's medical community during the Nazi regime (Sharav). The refusal to recognize such 
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crimes of humanity in their own country can be understandable, since it was a dark period in 
medical history when the focus was not on the care of the individual. But having the German 
Medical Association take responsibility for its past reaffirms the truth of the unethical human 
experimentation, and allows for a more open discussion on the fate of the data.  Moreover, this 
admission may help in bringing the debate closer to a resolution.  
Though one side of the argument may not get full control over the fate of the medical 
data, it is possible that there can be compromises suggested that might satisfy both sides of the 
debate. A possible compromise is to combine the idea of crediting the victims and memorializing 
the data. Using the data without crediting the researchers acknowledges the moral low point in 
human experimentation history, and also allows the scientific community use the contributions 
without absolving the researchers. Doing so can show how the scientific community manages to 
function when it comes to confronting the possible ramifications of human experimentation, and 
how they are able to continue doing good for society. It is already apparent how quickly an 
ethical mindset can change so that the majority of the group believes that they are in the right. 
Learning from past errors in judgment is the only way newer societies can improve their own 
ethical codes, and this is exactly how the scientific community functions. While it should never 
be forgotten that the Nazi period was a blight on scientific ethics, the possibility to find some 
good in all the evil should not be overlooked. Even unethically-obtained data can prove 
prosperous and necessary despite its origins so long as the credit is only given to the victims in 
order to honor them. Since the experiments can never be replicated ethically, to eliminate the 
data would be akin to denying possible future discoveries in the scientific community. However, 
while crediting the victims instead of the researchers may be sufficient for the scientific 
community, this alone cannot be enough to commemorate the victims of the experiments. It is 
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equally important to memorialize the data, whether in a physical or abstract manner, so that those 
outside the scientific community cannot forget what happened to all victims of human 
experimentation in Nazi Germany. The dignity that was stolen from them must be returned in 
some form, and thus giving the victims the power to tell their personal stories is essential when 
discussing the future of the medical data. Simply crediting the victims does not fully illustrate the 
pain and humiliation these people underwent; it turns individual experiences into impersonal 
data. To diminish the importance of the survivors’ personal narratives runs the risk that once the 
overall population begins to forget about the atrocities, the scientific community over time may 
feel it is no longer necessary to mention the victims. When it comes to unethical human 
experimentation, it is essential for the victims to be remembered always. Regardless of the 
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